The bad news is that Osama bin Laden has been trying to obtain nuclear weapons since the mid-1990s. The good news is that, as far as we know, he hasn’t been able to get them. But the United States faces risk from two crude but effective terror stratagems. One is a “dirty bomb,” or radioactivity dispersal device (RDD). An RDD consists of conventional explosives wrapped in a shroud of radioactive material that creates fallout when the bomb explodes. Intelligence officials think Al Qaeda has already obtained black-market cesium-137 and cobalt-60 and may be experimenting with RDDs in Afghanistan.

The other gambit would be a suicide attack on a nuclear power plant, most likely using an airplane. “A crop-duster wouldn’t have any effect,” says Elisa Harris, a National Security Council staffer during the Clinton years. “But a 747 would do the job.” Although chances of a nuclear blast are remote, such an attack could breach the containment dome and set off an unshielded meltdown. That could create a Chernobyl-like radioactive disaster with widespread fallout and many casualties.

The bomb itself remains the biggest fear. Essentially, terrorists can either build a bomb or steal one. Making a nuclear weapon is relatively easy if you have the basic design, a good machine shop and enough weapons-grade uranium. But U-238 and plutonium aren’t easy to get. Although there have been many reports of uranium trafficking in recent years, there is no evidence that weapons-grade material has leaked out.

That leaves theft. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the overriding concern of many nuclear-arms experts has been the diversion of atomic weapons into the wrong hands. Dr. William Potter, director of the Monterey Institute’s nonproliferation program, worries about the nukes on Russian Air Force bases. Potter says many impoverished former military officers still live on the bases, and some have been caught trying to steal conventional weapons. “I don’t want to suggest the weapons on these bases aren’t secure,” Potter says, “but they’re the ones I’d be most concerned about.”

Then there’s Pakistan, which by most estimates now has 30 to 50 nuclear bombs. Pakistan’s leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, must contend with a sizable minority of Muslim extremists, including some within the military. A coup could put Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal under their control, or a bin Laden sympathizer in the armed forces could steal one of the bombs. Potter says it’s “crucial” for Pakistan to plan for either contingency. It’s equally crucial for U.S. planners to consider the awful what-ifs.