A half century later, George Bush faces a similar problem. All fall he dithered while the Soviet Union crumbled, The president hesitated partly for practical reasons, because he was unsure just whom to help, or how. But Bush’s indecision was also rooted in domestic polities. Democrats blamed him for letting the economy sag while he focused on foreign policy. On his right were America-firsters; last week commentator Patrick Buchanan launched a presidential challenge based on “the new nationalism.” How was Bush to persuade his own people to shoulder the burden of a wider world?
The answer, in part, was the one his establishment forebears chose: scare the American voters. CIA Director Robert Gates and U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Robert Strauss went to Capitol Hill last week, where they raised the specter of a shattered Soviet Union unable to control its 27,000 nuclear weapons. If democratic leaders failed to put sausage in the stores, would new Stalins rise to fill the void? “No one can dismiss the possibility that darker political forces lurk in the wings,” warned Secretary of State James Baker in a speech at Princeton University. The PR offensive was carefully coordinated-and at least as far as nuclear weapons were concerned, somewhat hyped. According to knowledgeable Pentagon officials, the risk of some nuclear warheads getting into the wrong hands-those of terrorists, say-is slight. (It is possible that some Soviet nuclear scientist will sell his services to an unsavory bidder.) But exaggerating the Soviet threat helped persuade Congress to pass the Marshall Plan, and the Bush men figure similar tactics would work again. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson confided to his colleagues at the beginning of the cold war, it is sometimes necessary to make arguments that are “clearer than the truth.”
By having Baker call at Princeton for an international conference on Soviet aid, Bush was borrowing another page from the Truman playbook. The plan to aid Europe was announced at Harvard in 1947 not by the president but by Secretary of State George C. Marshall (hence the Marshall Plan). With the spotlight on Baker, Bush was able to give himself political cover. And by making the rescue effort seem truly international, Bush wanted to send the signal that Americans would not be stuck with the check.
The big difference between then and now, of course, is that in 1947 the United States was by far the richest nation in the world, and today it feels comparatively broke. The Marshall Plan cost more than $100 billion in 1991 dollars. The Bush administration is suggesting a paltry $600 million to help the Soviets, and two thirds of that is to aid nuclear disarmament. The Bush administration was reluctant to spend even that much until Ambassador Strauss braced the president to take a political risk. America’s allies were barely consulted about the hastily called conference, but they will have to pony up most of the money. The major contributor to any relief effort will have to be Japan, which might be persuaded to write large checks in return for the Soviets returning control of the Kuril Islands, seized during World War II. The wealthy Arab nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have already pledged $4 billion in Soviet relief. The fear of millions of Muslims splitting off from the Soviet Union to join Iran to the south may make the Saudis and their Arab allies dig even deeper.
Handing out the aid will be a monumental task. It is still far from clear who is in charge throughout the various republics. Despite a poor harvest, the Soviets probably have enough food, but they lack a way to distribute it. Farmers horde their produce, awaiting price liberation. Roads and railways in the Soviet Union are in wretched shape. It is entirely possible that the West will have to create its own distribution network, probably by using the military. Before the winter is out, the world could be treated to the strange spectacle of NATO convoys penetrating deep into their old enemy on a mission of mercy. Will the aid buy peace and stability? It would be naive to expect a miracle like the Marshall Plan. In postwar Europe, democratic and free-market institutions only needed to be restored. In the Soviet Union they have to be built from scratch. But if money and help can buy a little time and ease the sense of panic, then a relief effort will be well worth it.
